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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ZONING - ZONING LEGISLATION FOR SOLELY AESTHETIC
PURPOSES HELD NOT WITHIN THE POLICE POWERS OF THE
STATE WITH CERTAIN SPECIFIED EXCEPTIONS. MAYOR AND
CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE V. MANO SWARTZ, 268 Md. 79,
299 A.2d 828 (1973).
With the advent of the large, urban, metropolitan centers at the turn
of the twentieth century, a need arose to regulate and control further
growth of the cities. Zoning soon developed as an effective device to
meet this need. Some people, believing that the beauty of our cities is
similarly deserving of municipal control, have espoused the opinion that
such ends should be achieved through the use of aesthetic zoning. These
endeavors have been the subject of considerable litigation in which the
constitutionality of zoning for aesthetic purposes has been challenged.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz,' a recent
Maryland case considering this controversy, adopts the majority view of
invalidating such legislation, thereby rejecting a recent trend toward
recognition of aesthetic zoning as a proper legislative tool.
Encouraged by its success in limiting both the size and design of signs
in the Charles Center project,2 the City of Baltimore enacted an
ordinance3 expressly intending to achieve similar results in the re-
1. 268 Md. 79, 299 A.2d 828 (1973).
2. These objectives had been accomplished through the use of leasehold restrictive covenants
rather than zoning devices. The City, which had previously acquired ownership to the
land, either by purchase or condemnation, executed leases with private developers whose
construction plans were regulated by the limitations of these restrictive covenants. One
such lease (for the block bound by Charles, Redwood, Hanover and Baltimore Streets -
block #647) contained the provision that prior to construction the developer, the Charles
Center Theatre Building, Inc., had first to obtain the approval of the Baltimore Urban
Renewal and Housing Agency with regard to the specifications of the construction plans. It
was agreed as follows:
The Agency shall have the right to refuse to approve any such drawings, plans or
specifications that are not suitable or desirable, in its opinion, for aesthetic or
functional reasons, and in so passing upon such drawings, plans and specifications,
it shall have the right to take into consideration ... the harmony thereof with the
surroundings, and the effect of the building or other structures, as planned, on the
outlook from other portions of the Charles Center Project.
Lease, Executed August 5, 1964 & Recorded January 4, 1965 among the Land Records of
Baltimore City in Liber J.F.C. 1818, folio 423, 436. The conveyance further contained
restrictions pertaining to the use permitted on the land (e.g., correctional or penal institu-
tions, dog pounds and funeral homes were prohibited), and on the height of the buildings
to be constructed thereon. With regard to signs the lease provides: "No sign which is to
be seen from the exterior ... shall be permitted to be erected ... unless and until said
sign has been approved in writing by the Agency." Id. at 437-38.
3. Baltimore, Md., Ordinance 663, November 1, 1965: now BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 1, § 39
(1966).
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mainder of the downtown area of the City.4 The ordinance was "[d Ie-
signed and intended to provide for beauty, attractiveness, esthetics,
[and] symmetry in ... commercial signs ... and to relieve conditions
of gaudiness and drabness in certain portions of the defined area."' To
achieve this end, the ordinance banned erection of signs on the roof of
any building and prohibited signs which extended more than twelve
inches from the surface of any building.6 A five year moratorium was
established to allow merchants with nonconforming signs either to
correct or to remove them.' On October 30, 1970, shortly before the
expiration of the grace period, Mano Swartz, Inc. and nine other firms
operating in the affected area filed a bill seeking to enjoin the enforce-
ment of the ordinance.'
Mano Swartz contested the constitutionality of the ordinance on the
theory that laws passed solely for aesthetic purposes do not promote
the public health, safety, welfare or morals and consequently do not
fall within the 'purview of the police power.' The City replied that the
right to erect signs is not a vested property right' 0 and that control
4. The downtown area is defined as "the area bounded on the outer limits, respectively, of
Center Street on the north, Pratt Street on the south, the Fallsway on the east, Greene
Street on the west, and Druid Hill Avenue on the north-west." BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art.
1, § 39(c) (1966).
5. Id. § 39(d).
6. Section 39(e) stated in full:
It shall be unlawful, within the area described, (1) for any commercial sign,
billboard, or other advertising structure or device to project outward from the
primary surface of the building to which it is attached for a distance of more than 12
inches. The commercial sign, billboard, or other advertising structure or device
shall be single-faced and shall not project above the top of the vertical wall of the
building to which it is attached; (2) to erect any flashing, animated, or rotating
sign; (3) for any commercial sign, billboard, or other advertising sign or device to be
permitted or erected on the roof of any building; (4) for any commercial sign,
billboard, or other advertising structure or device to be painted on any exterior wall
of a building except as a substitute for a sign on the primary facade of said building.
Id. § 39(e).
7. Id. § 39(g).
8. A fine was established in § 39(i) of "not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) and not more
than one hundred dollars ($100.00) for each violation. Each day upon which a violation
continues may be construed as a separate offense." Id. § 39(i).
9. 269 Md. 79, 85, 299 A.2d 828, 831-32 (1973). The term "police power" is generally defined
to be the power of the soverign to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to protect the
health, morals, safety and general welfare of the community and its subjects. Unlike
condemnation proceedings, those affected by zoning legislation are not compensated for the
deprivation of the use or enjoyment of their property by the state. See, e.g., LaRoque v.
Board of County Comm'rs of Prince Georges County, 233 Md. 329, 196 A.2d 902 (1964);
Jaime Gonzales A. v. Ghingher, 218 Md. 648, 145 A.2d 769 (1958); Burley v. City of
Annapolis, 182 Md. 307 (1943).
Police power is delegated to the respective municipalities from the state to be used
in lieu of specific statutory or constitutional provisions. Certain limitations have
been placed upon the use of this power .... The primary limitation is that its
exercise serve a public and not a private interest. Further, it must be rationally
formulated, impartially administered, and the means must be appropriate for the
desired purpose.
Masotti, Aesthetic Zoning and the Police Power, 46 J. URBAN L. 773, 774 (1969) (citations
omitted).
10. Section 214 of the Baltimore Code establishes mandatory safety requirements for the use of
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over them is a necessary and proper function of the police power.'
The Circuit Court of Baltimore City held for the complainants, thereby
invalidating the ordinance. On appeal, the City's position was again
rejected on the theory that a zoning ordinance of this nature, enacted
strictly for aesthetic purposes,' 2 is not a permissible use of the police
power.' The Court of Appeals reasoned that because aesthetic con-
siderations depend on human sensibilities they are necessarily incapable
of objective treatment and are subject to arbitrariness and vagueness.' 4
In concluding that the ordinance was invalid, the court made no
attempt to determine whether the standards imposed thereby were
capable of an objective treatment.
The concept of zoning as a proper and valid function of the police
power is well established' s Although one's right to the beneficial use
and enjoyment of his property is a basic tenet of our legal system, it is
also well established that restrictions on use may be promulgated for
signs, but there are none, with the exception of those mentioned in art. 1 § 39, which
control their aesthetic quality. However, the Code does provide, § 499 that "(aj Minor
Privilege permit approved by the Board of Estimates is required for all signs on or over any
street, alley, or other public way or property owned by the Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore .... BALTIMORE, MD., CODE § 499 (1966). Mano Swartz expressed no opinion as
to whether the City could achieve its objective through the exercise of this power by
denying such a permit to a business on the sole ground that their sign was determined to be
aesthetically unfit. 268 Md. at 85, 299 A.2d at 831.
11. 268 Md. at 85-86, 299 A.2d at 832.
12. It was conceded by all parties that Ordinance 663 was enacted for aesthetic reasons. The
purpose of the Ordinance, "to provide for the beauty, attractiveness, and esthetics" was
stated quite clearly in art. 1, § 39(d) of the Code. Additionally, while testifying before the
lower court, an architect directly involved in the drafting of the ordinance testified that
aesthetic considerations guided the drafting.
13. Aside from the defects found in the City's argument on the merits of aesthetic zoning, the
court also held that the Ordinance, being an amendment to the zoning law, "was enacted
without complying with the substantive and procedural requirements of the Zoning
Enabling Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1967 Repl. Vol.) Art. 66B, in effect at the time."
Mayor and City Council of Balto. v. Mano Swartz, 268 Md. 79 91, 299 A.2d 828. 834
(1973). This conclusion was based on the following reasons:
The Ordinance failed to heed the mandate of sec. 3 that it be in *accordance with a
comprehensive plan' or that of sec. 2, that it be 'uniform for each class or kind of
building throughout each district': nor was sec. 5, which requires public hearings
and at least 15 days' notice, complied with.
Id. at 91, 299 A.2d at 834-35.
14. The court reasoned:
The principle difficulty is that other forms of pollution, stench and noise and the like,
can be measured by more nearly objective standards. If beauty, however, lies in the
eyes of the beholder, so does the tawdry, the gaudy and the vulgar - and courts
have traditionally taken a gingerly approach to legislation which circumscribes
property rights by applying what amount to subjective standards which may well be
those of an idiosyncratic group.
Id. at 91, 299 A.2d at 834-35.
15. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Supreme Court held
that zoning legislation would be upheld providing it was not arbitrary or unreasonable and
had some relation to the preservation of the public health, safety, morals or welfare. This
doctrine was also enunciated in County Comm'rs of Anne Arundel County v. Ward. 186
Md. 330, 46 A.2d 684 (1946).
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the public good.' 6 Zoning has historically proven to be an effective
device to implement the interests of society.' '
Initial attempts to incorporate aesthetic considerations within the
objectives of the zoning power were generally denounced by the courts
because questions of beauty were not believed to be of sufficient
importance for the state to invoke its police powers.' 8 This view, with
various modifications and exceptions has survived as the majority
opinion throughout the nation. 9
Two reasons have generally been advanced by the courts for their
refusal to uphold legislation enacted for purely aesthetic purposes.
First, it has often been held that aesthetic considerations do not fall
within the constitutional limitations placed on the zoning power that
such legislation promote the health, safety, morals or general welfare of
the community.2
Zoning restrictions based on aesthetic values have been further at-
tacked on the grounds that they lacked uniformity and were based on
arbitrary standards. Those advocating this belief reasoned that differ-
ences of tastes and ideas do not lend themselves to objective standards:
Successive city councils might never agree as to what the public
needs from an aesthetic standpoint, and this fact makes the
aesthetic standard entirely impractical as a standard for use
restriction upon property. The world would be at a continual
seesaw if aesthetic considerations were permitted to govern the
use of the police power.2
Most states follow this view generally, but many jurisdictions have
modified their position to various degrees. For instance it has often
been decreed that although aesthetic considerations alone cannot form
16. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941). See also
Carney v. City of Baltimore, 201 Md. 130, 93 A.2d 74 (1952).
17. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 23 (1938).
18. See, e.g., Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909); Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 130 P. 828
(1913); Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 128 A. 50 (1925); Commonwealth v. Boston
Adv. Co., 188 Mass. 348, 74 N.E. 601 (1905); Quintini v. City of Bay St. Louis, 64 Miss.
483, 1 So. 625 (1887).
19. To date, Florida (City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364
(1941)), Hawaii (State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967)), New
York (People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42
(1963)), and Oregon (Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965)) have been the
only states to unequivocally hold that aesthetic purposes, by themselves, are sufficient
basis for zoning legislation.
20. In City of Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting, A. & S.P. Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 62 A. 267 (1905),
the court considered the validity of an ordinance enacted by the city of' Passaic, New
Jersey to regulate the placement of signs. The court held that whereas zoning laws
promoting the safety of the community would be upheld, those with aesthetic purposes
would not: "Aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of
necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the police power to take
private property without compensation." Id. at 287, 62 A. at 268.
21. City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio 654, 656, 148 N.E. 842, 844 (1925).
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the basis for a state exercising its police power, they may be taken into
account as a minor or incidental reason.2 2 Another example is the
"character of the district" criterion in which, as its name suggests,
particular attention must be given to the area which the particular
zoning ordinance would effect.2 3 A third position, which has been
adopted in a few states, is that aesthetic factors alone are a sufficient
basis for zoning, but these courts have generally found a relation
between the aesthetic consideration and other factors, most notably
economic ones,"' which have traditionally been recognized as valid
exercises of the police power.2 s
There does exist a contrary view to these beliefs. A small minority of
the states have held that zoning for aesthetic purposes alone should be
upheld under the auspices of the "general welfare" of the community.
The theory underlying this viewpoint is that the enhancement of the
beauty of a district would benefit the public as a whole and therefore is
a valid exercise of the police power.
The Supreme Court accepted this view in Berman v. Parker.2 6
Although involving a law enacted by Congress which condemned a
blighted area, pertaining to an urban renewal project in Washington
D.C., rather than a zoning ordinance, Berman has signficance in that the
Court expressly recognized that the concept of the "general welfare" of
a community is sufficiently broad to encompass aesthetic considera-
tions. The Court ruled:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aes-
thetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful
as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled. . . . If those who govern the District
of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beauti-
22. See, e.g., National Advertisement Co. v. County of Monterey, 211 Cal. App. 2d 375, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 136 (1962); Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); Stoner
McCray System v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d 843 (1956); 122 Main
Street Corp. v. Brockton, 323 Mass. 646, 84 N.E.2d 13 (1949); Piscitelli v. Township
Comm. of Township of Scotch Plains, 103 N.J. Super. 589, 248 A.2d 274 (1968).
23. E.g., Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957);
Livingston Township v. Marchev, 85 N.J. Super. 428, 205 A.2d 65 (1964). See also Masotti,
supra note 9, at 788.
24. The use of "economic factors" in upholding aesthetically aimed legislation is in reality
"escapist reasoning." A decrease in the market value of a neighborhood is symptomatic of
the decline in its aesthetic appeal created by an "eyesore." When the attractiveness of an
area deteriorates, this fact becomes manifested as its economic value similarly declines.
Michelman, Towards a Practical Standard for Aesthetic Regulation, 15 PRAC. LAW. 37
(1969). "The decline in market value, therefore, ought to be regarded as a kind of socially
computerized, objective evidence that the regulated activity is by a social consensus
deemed intrinsically ugly, negatively suggestive, or destructive of prior existing beauty."
Id. at 37.
25. See, e.g., Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923); City of New
Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953).
26. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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ful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment
that stands in the way.
2 7
Similar reasoning was advantageously employed in City of Miami
Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co.2" There the court upheld legislation
designed to prohibit the erection of commercial facilities in an area
theretofore used for recreational activities. The court noted:
It is fundamental that one may be deprived of his property
without due process of law, but it is also well established that
he may be restricted in the use of it when that is necessary to
the common good. So in this case we must weigh against the
public weal plaintiff's rights to enjoy unhampered property.
29
With this principle established, the court felt justified in upholding
the ordinance, relating Miami Beach's beauty and attractiveness to its
general welfare. "It is difficult to see how the success of Miami Beach
could continue if its aesthetic appeal were ignored because the beauty
of the community is a distinct lure to the winter traveler.,
3 0
While some jurisdictions have recognized that the concept of beauty
for its own merits is deserving of municipal control, there have been
numerous decisions which have attempted to camouflage the inherent
aesthetic issues under the veil of public health and safety.3 ' These
decisions have attempted to rationalize legislation clearly enacted for
the maintenance and improvement of community appearance. An ex-
27. Id. at 33.
28. 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941).
29. Id. at 485, 3 So. 2d at 366. Although the "character of the district" involved was discussed,
it was not of primary importance in the decision.
30. Id. at 487, 3 So. 2d at 367. This position was recently adopted in State v. Diamond Motors,
Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967), where the court considered the validity of an
ordinance restricting outdoor advertising signs for aesthetic reasons. The court held:
"[Tihe application of the ordinance to appellants constituted a regulation for the public
welfare under the City's police power in a legitimate field for legitimate aesthetic reasons
and that it does not constitute a taking of private property without the payment of
compensation." Id. at 38, 429 P.2d at 828.
31. St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911).
See also Oscar P. Gustafson v. City of Minneapolis, 231 Minn. 271, 42 N.W.2d 809 (1950).
wherein the court, while recognizing the aesthetic issues, based their decision upholding an
ordinance banning overhanging signs on health and safety factors. The court noted: "An
overhanging sign, for instance, extending over every 25 foot store front along a retail street
would be an obstruction to light and view and would have potentialities of danger.- Id. at
277, 42 N.W.2d at 812.
Mano Swartz similarly adopts such reasoning. Although it invalidated Ordinance 663
due to its aesthetic nature, the court strongly hinted that the legislation would have been
upheld had the City changed its "supposed" intention when it had enacted the law. The
court noted: "The City might well have prevailed had the legislative intent been the
elimination of signs or pennants which distracted motorists ... or the promotion of
highway safety.... The fact that another result might have been one which was
aesthetically pleasing would not necessarily have imported an element of constitutional
infirmity." 268 Md. at 87, 299 A.2d at 832-33.
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ample of such maneuvering is found in St. Louis Gunning Advertise-
ment Co. v. City of St. Louis.3 2 There the court considered the validity
of legislation prohibiting the use of billboards along certain highways.
Signboards were banned because:
[T] hey endanger the public health, promote immorality, con-
stitute hiding places and retreats for criminals and all classes of
miscreants. ... [and] are also inartistic and unsightly. In cases
of fire they often cause their spread and constitute barriers
against their extinction; and in cases of high wind, their tem-
porary character, frail structure and broad surface, render them
liable to be blown down and to fall upon those who may
happen to be in their vicinity. . . . [T] he ground in the rear
thereof is being constantly used as privies and dumping ground
for all kinds of waste and deleterious matters, and thereby
creating public nuisances and jeopardizing public health
... [T]he lowest form of prostitution and other acts of im-
morality are frequently carried on, almost under public gaze;
they offer shelter and concealment for the criminal while lying
in wait for his victim; and last, but not least, they obstruct the
light, sunshine, and air, which are so conducive to health and
comfort ..... .
The ordinance, the purpose of which was obviously aesthetic, was
upheld, but the court's rationale totally circumvented the real issues.
Mano Swartz does not unequivocally hold that aesthetic considera-
tions can never be a sufficient basis for zoning legislation. Preservation
of areas of historical or architectural significance are functions properly
within the exercise of the police power.3 4 Garrett v. James,3 5 cited by
the court in Mano Swartz, considered the validity of an ordinance
which permitted the erection of "porticoes, steps, or other ornamental
structures" on Mount Vernon Place for a distance not to exceed nine
feet. It was contended that the act was inconsistent with an earlier
ordinance which would have prohibited such an extension from the
building. The court reconciled the two laws on the ground that Mount
32. 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911).
33. Id. at 110, 137 S.W. at 942.
34. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B. § 8.01(a) (1970), known as the "Maryland Planning and Zoning
Enabling Act," declares -the preservation of' structures of' historic and architectural
value... [to be a] public purpose .... The rationale for this ordinance was stated in
§ 8.01(b) of the same article:
The purpose of an ordinance or resolution in any county or municipal
corporation shall be (1) to safeguard the heritage of the county or municipal
corporation by preserving the district therein which reflects elements of its cultural,
social, economic, political, or architectural history ... (3) to foster civic beauty ...
and (5) to promote the use and preservation of historic districts for the educa-
tion, welfare, and pleasure of the residents of the county or municipal corporations.
Id. § 8.01(b).
35. 65 Md. 260, 3 A. 597 (1886).
19731
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Vernon Place is an area of architectural distinction, and is thereby
entitled to aesthetic consideration by the law-makers.
3 6
The court further declared that legislation may be enacted to prevent
the visual pollution of areas which the public generally regards as
aesthetically pleasing. The court stated: "[E]mphasis should be laid
upon the character of the place as having an established claim to
consideration and upon the idea of disfigurement as distinguished from
the falling short of some standard of beauty."'3 In effect, areas which
are unblighted or aesthetically pleasing can be proper subjects of
legislation motivated to preserve their naturalness and beauty,3 8 but
the legislature may not use the zoning power to upgrade the visual
character of a neighborhood. Thus, Maryland clearly falls within the
majority view which advocates that consideration should first be given
to the "character of the district" before a determination can be made
on any legislative endeavors aimed at controlling its visual appeal.
By ruling that the enhancement of the aesthetic appeal of an area,
absent other factors, does not fall within the realm of promoting the
"general welfare" of the community,3" Mano Swartz has chosen to
affirm long-established precedents rather then examining the current
needs of our cities. This unyielding adherence to stare decisis is inade-
quate to cope with the immediate problems of society.
Increasing awareness of one's environment in the last decade has
resulted in a shifting of man's attitudes-one of which is that it is
equally undesirable to live in an aesthetically blighted neighborhood as
it is near a structure that offends ones olfactory nerves4 or audio
senses. 4 In Preferred Tires v. Village of Hempstead4 2 such changing of
priorities was recognized and accepted. That case, like Mano Swartz,
involved an attempt by the local legislative body to prohibit the
hanging of all types of signs "from the face of any building over any
sidewalk, street, highway or alley." Although the facts of the two cases
36. See also Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md. 220, 70 A. 113 (1908) cited in Mano Swartz.
37. 268 Md. at 92, 299 A.2d at 835, quoting from E. FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN
LEGISLATION 115-16 (1917).
38. Such regions may range from natural forests and parks to the suburbs. The court cited
cases where an ordinance which required the removal of billboards from the suburbs
(Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957)) and
cases which banned funeral homes from residential areas (Ullrich v. State, 186 Md. 353, 46
A.2d 637 (1946); and Jack Lewis, Inc. v. Baltimore, 164 Md. 146, 164 A. 220 (1933)) were
upheld. 268 Md. at 91, 299 A.2d at 835.
39. The concluding paragraph of the opinion stated: "Because the purpose of the Ordinance
was not the preservation or protection of something which was aesthetically pleasing, but
rather was intended to achieve by regulation an aesthetically pleasing result, with no
thought of enhancing the public welfare, we shall not disturb the result reached below."
268 Md. at 92, 299 A.2d at 835.
40. See, e.g., State v. Primeau, 70 Wash. 2d 109, 422 P.2d 302 (1967), which examines the issue
of disturbing odors caused by a piggery.
41. See, e.g., Muehlman v. Keilman, 272 N.E.2d 591 (Ind. 1971), dealing with the problems of
noise pollution resulting from the racing of a truck's deisel engines throughout the day and
night.
42. 173 Misc. 1017, 19 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. (1940)).
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are similar, the holdings are diverse. In Preferred Tires the ordinance
was upheld for the sole reason that the enhancement of the aesthetic
appeal of the village would help result in a higher quality of life for its
inhabitants. The court commented:
For years the courts have strained to sustain the validity of
regulatory or prohibitory ordinances of this character upon the
basis of the public safety. They decided that aesthetic consid-
erations could afford no basis for sustaining such legislation.
... But the views of the public change in the passing of years.
What was deemed wrong in the past is looked upon very often
today as eminently proper. What was looked upon as unreason-
able in the past is very often considered perfectly reasonable
today. Among the changes which have come in the viewpoint of
the public is the idea that our cities and villages should be
beautiful and that the creation of such beauty tends to the
happiness, contentment, comfort, prosperity and general wel-
fare of our citizens.4 3
Although man's right to possess and use his property is still a
fundamental concept of our legal system, it is equally understood that
such use must be tempered so as not to injure society as a whole:
Activity is beyond governmental concern if only the agent is
significantly affected by it. But if his behavior radiates external
impacts on other people, then public intervention is legitimate.
... An owner's insistence on creating what his neighbors regard
as ugliness, altering their preferred tone of the neighborhood,
spoiling their enjoyment of a favored view-all these things
plainly affect persons other than himself.
The owner would be imposing unilaterally, what could be
called a redistribution of welfare from his neighbors to himself.
This is precisely the kind of situation in which the government
is normally permitted to arbitrate.4
The use of aesthetic zoning as a tool in city planning has long
been recognized.4 s It becomes particularly significant when used in
conjunction with the redevelopment of a large metropolitan area.
Implemented properly, such planning will "further the welfare of the
people in the city . . . by aiding in the creation of a more efficient,
healthful and attractive environment ... 6
43. Id. at 1019, 19 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
44. Michelman. supra note 24, at 38-39. See also Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35. 400 P.2d
255 (1965), wherein the court recognized this philosophy: "JT]he inhabitants of the city
have the right to forego the economic gain and the person whose business plans are
frustrated is not entitled to have his interest weighed more heavily than the predominant
interest of others in the community." Id. at 50, 400 P.2d at 263.
45. Address by Frederick L. Olmstead, Second National Conference on City Planning and
Congestion of Population, May 2, 1910.
46. New York Chapter, American Institute of Planners, Proposed Alternative Statements, in
1973]
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When communities are allowed to expand haphazzardly, with no
thought to an over-all master plan, aesthetically disjointed and often
blighted areas frequently develop as a consequence.4 7 The long-range
result of such growth is a diminishing of "land values, assessments and
tax returns ...."' 8 The Charles Center project is an excellent example
of how these problems can be controlled when redevelopment plans are
drawn with a concern for the aesthetic qualities of a renewed area. The
ordinance invalidated in Mano Swartz was part of that redevelopment
effort. The City wanted to make the business area surrounding the
redeveloped area more attractive by eliminating unsightly and in some
cases garish signs. It was anticipated that a more aesthetically pleasing
downtown would attract people, resulting in more business for mer-
chants and generally a more viable downtown. In view of the intended
purpose and anticipated effect of the aesthetic zoning ordinance in-
volved in Mano Swartz, it is difficult to understand the court's conclu-
sion that the ordinance does not enhance the public welfare and thus is
not a proper object of the police power.
The objection that considerations of beauty are subjective and thus
incapable of objective treatment is not without merit. But ordinances
based on aesthetic considerations should not be invalidated merely
because the standards are difficult to formulate or apply. The courts
have allowed the legislatures to attempt to regulate obscenity despite
the Surpreme Court's inability to define what is obscene.4 Unlike
obscenity statutes, zoning ordinances do not involve a conflict with
First Amendment rights. Thus broad discretion should be given to the
legislative bodies to develop standards of what is beautiful. Only when a
particular standard adopted by a legislature is so clearly arbitrary as to
bear no relation to the public welfare should the court interfere.
The scope of judicial review of legislative enactments is limited.
Statutes are presumed constitutional,'" and will be invalidated only
when they clearly contravene a provision in the state or federal consti-
tutions.' 1 An exercise of the police power should be upheld unless it is
so arbitrary as to bear no relation to the public health, morals, safety or
welfare.' 2 The conclusion of the Mano Swartz court that the ordinance
there considered bore no relation to the public welfare because its sole
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purpose was to achieve "an aesthetically pleasing result"5' 3 is at least
questionable. Thus the application of the usual standards of judicial
review to the facts of Mano Swartz should yield a contrary result.
Mano Swartz is significant in that the court failed to recognize the
interrelation between a community's aesthetic appeal and its general
welfare. In time, when positions like those advocated in the states
which accept aesthetic zoning emerge as the majority rule throughout
the nation, a Maryland court will no doubt be swept along in the
aftertow. In the intervening years, Maryland will be denied a useful tool
in the struggle to enhance the beauty of its cities and to improve the
quality of life for its citizens.
Ronald Carroll
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL
BY SECURED PARTY FOLLOWING DEFAULT REPOSSESSION.
HARRIS V. BOWER, 266 Md. 579,295 A.2d 870 (1972).
In Harris v. Bower1 the plaintiff brought an action for an accounting
and other equitable relief with regard to the repossession of a boat.
Plaintiff's late husband (Harris) purchased the boat in April 1966 from
the defendant for $17,000, giving a promissory note secured by a
security interest in the boat. Harris died in June 1969 leaving an
outstanding balance due on the boat of the entire purchase price. The
defendant refused to accept the boat in satisfaction of the debt since
the market value had decreased to $13,900. In October 1969 the
defendant sued to reduce the plaintiff's debt to judgment. A summary
judgment was granted for $21,738. As Harris' estate was insolvent, the
defendant repossessed the boat in March 1970 for the purpose of
reselling it and applying the proceeds to satisfaction of the judgment.
Defendant's efforts to resell in the two years that he held the boat
included only one advertisement in a local paper which brought forth
only three offers, all for less than the appraised market value.2 No
advertisements were placed in any trade journals or newspapers.
The plaintiff filed her bill of complaint for an accounting, damages
and other relief two years after repossession of the boat by the
defendant. The plaintiff contended that the defendant had accepted
and retained possession of the boat in satisfaction of the obligation as
was one of his options under § 9-505(2) of the Uniform Commercial
53. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, 268 Md. 79, 92, 299 A.2d 828, 835
(1973).
1. 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (1972).
2. Id. at 582-84, 295 A.2d at 871-72.
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